CIVIL PROCEDURE-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-STATUTE TOLLED
DURING PERIOD OF UNCONSCIOUSNEss-Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons,

108 N.J. Super. 99, 260 A.2d 228 (App. Div. 1969), cert. denied, 55
N.J. 448, 262 A.2d 702 (1970).
On April 12, 1966, John Sobin, Jr. fell from a tree he was trimming when a rope he had purchased from M. Frisch 8c Sons snapped,
causing him to be thrown more than thirty feet to the ground. As a
consequence of the fall, Sobin was hospitalized for more than 100 days,
during which time his mental awareness fluctuated between total and
semi-unconsciousness.'
Sobin instituted an action grounded on negligence and breach of
warranty in August, 1967, naming M. Frisch 8c Sons as the sole defen-

dant. Subsequently, Sobin's counsel discovered that the quality of the
rope had been misrepresented by the distributor, 2 Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation, and permission was sought to amend the complaint

to include that company as a co-defendant. Although leave to amend
was granted and the amended complaint was filed May 16, 1968, a summary judgment was decreed the distributor because the two year statute of limitations had run. 3 Plaintiff argued that his mental condition
was such that it constituted insanity, and that an extension of time
should have been granted for the period of unconsciousness under the
disability provisions of the New Jersey statute of limitations. 4 The
1 Upon his admittance to Middlesex General Hospital, Sobin was examined and
listed as suffering from brain trauma, right side hemiplegia and aphasia, multiple fractures of the facial bones, fractures of the ulna styloid with displacement of the head of
the humerus and comminuted subtrochanteric fracture with displacement of the right
hip. Brief for Appellant at 2, Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons, 108 N.J. Super. 99, 260 A.2d 228
(App. Div. 1969).
2 The rope was represented to be manila, while actually it was of sisal fiber, which
is significantly lower in tensile strength. Brief for Appellant at 4, Sobin v. M. Frisch &
Sons, 108 N.J. Super. 99, 260 A.2d 228 (App. Div. 1969).
3 Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons, No. L-40002-66 (L. Div. Jan. 17, 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:14-2 provides:
Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2
years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.
It should be noted that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-725 (1962), which established a four
year limitation period on actions for breach of sales contracts covered by the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, was disregarded in Sobin, and the two year personal injury statute,
mentioned above, was held to apply. This comports with the theory that a breach of
warranty is grounded on negligence and the cause of action accrues, not when the duty
is breached by the manufacturer, but rather when the injury actually occurs. Rosenau v.
New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 141-44, 238 A.2d 169, 174-76 (1968).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-21 (1952) provides:
If any person entitled to any of the actions or proceedings specified in Sec-
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trial judge rejected plaintiff's contention, and held that the disability
5
provisions of the statute were not intended to cover unconsciousness.
The appellate division overturned the lower court's interpretation of
the statute, and held that unconsciousness for 100 days was sufficient to
constitute "insanity" under the provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 1421.6 This decision supplied a long awaited answer to the problem of
unconsciousness and its effect on the New Jersey statute of limitations.
Historically, limitations of actions arose when the English Parliament could no longer endure the abuses resulting from outdated litigation. In creating these statutes of repose, it sought to force parties to act
promptly on their claims. American legislatures have endorsed the
policy reasons behind the English provisions and, accordingly, have en7
acted similar statutes.
The term statute of limitations has been defined as "any law which
fixes the time within which parties must take judicial action to enforce
rights or else be thereafter barred from enforcing them."" The primary
purpose of such a law is "to limit the time within which an action may
be brought" by compelling "the exercise of a right of action within a
reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend."10
Since a statute of limitations achieves its purpose of preventing the
litigating of stale claims by stimulating diligence and punishing tardiness, the disabilty exception which tolls the statute in certain circumstances is a necessary inclusion. 1 ' Without it, blameless parties might be
stripped of their right to bring an action.
"Insanity" has been defined as an unsoundness of mind, an incapacity to reason and, in a legal sense, such a want of reason, memory
and intelligence, as prevents a man from comprehending the nature of
tions 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 . . . of this title is or shall be, at the time of any such

cause of action . . . accruing, under the age of 21 years, or insane, such person
may commence such action . . . within such time as limited by said sections,
after his coming to or being of full age or of sane mind.
5 Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons, 108 N.J. Super. 99, 102-03, 260 A.2d 228, 230 (App. Div.
1969), cert. denied, 55 N.J. 448, 262 A.2d 702 (1970).
6 Id. at 104, 260 A.2d at 231.
7 Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 103, 207 A.2d 513, 514 (1965);
see also H. Woon, A TREATISE ON LIMITATIONS OF AcrIONS AT LAW AND IN EqurrY (4th ed.
1916).
8 City of Atlanta v. Barrett, 102 Ga. App. 469, 471, 116 S.E.2d 654, 657 (1960).
9 Industrial Comm'n v. Weaver, 81 Colo. 191, 193, 254 P. 444, 445 (1927).
10 Union City Housing Auth. v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 335, 136 A.2d
401, 403-04 (1957).
11 For an excellent summary of the development of the disability provision in the
New Jersey statute of limitations, see Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100,
103-06, 207 A.2d 513, 514-16 (1965).
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his acts. 12 Webster defines the condition of insanity as implying a mental disorder resulting in an inability to manage one's affairs and perform one's social duties. 18 Since insanity is a broad generic term, 4 properly defining it for a specific application necessarily entails a review of
its use in previous related cases. Such a review discloses a consistency in
the treatment of the word that clearly supports its use in Sobin.
In 1948, the Supreme Court of Georgia found a person insane under the Georgia statute of limitations, 15 where he did not have the mental capacity to understand simple subjects or to transact any business.' 6
That definition was recently affirmed when it was held that mental incapacity to comprehend the contents or effect of a property deed con17
stituted insanity and tolled the statute of limitations.
Browne v. Smith' s defined insanity under the limitations of actions
statute in Colorado 19 as a condition which prevents a person from being
able to properly transact his business affairs. More recently, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the statute was tolled by a tortious
injury rendering the party unable to conduct her business affairs due
to brain damage and severe headaches. 20 The court considered the purpose of the statute of limitations, and decided that to rigidly apply it,
where a party had been intentionally injured by another and this injury had prevented a timely action, "would result in callous injus2
tice." 1
Oklahoma, in 1963, recognized that insanity under its statute of
limitations 22 resulted when a person did not understand the nature or
12 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 929 (4th ed. 1957).
13 MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1294 (2d ed. 1924).

14 Aponte v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 450, 153 A.2d 665, 669 (1959): "Insanity" has many
meanings. A man may be insane for one purpose and sane for another.
15 GA. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (1935) provides:

Infants, idiots, or insane persons, or persons imprisoned, who are such when
the cause of action shall have accrued, shall be entitled to the same time, after
the disability shall have been removed, to bring an action, as is prescribed for
other persons.
16 Mullins v. Barrett, 204 Ga. 11, 48 S.E.2d 842 (1948).
17 Spearman v. Jones, 226 Ga. 27, 172 S.E.2d 602 (1970).
1s 119 Colo. 469, 205 P.2d 239 (1949).
19 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 102-1-16 (1935) stated:

If any person entitled to bring any of the actions before mentioned in this
chapter shall, at the time when the cause of action accrues, be within the age of
twenty-one years, or a married woman, insane, imprisoned, or absent from the
United States, such person may bring the said actions, within the time in this
chapter respectively limited, after the disability shall be removed.
20 Klamm Shell v. Berg, 165 Colo. 540, 441 P.2d 10 (1968).
21 Id. at 546, 441 P.2d at 13.
22 OLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 94 (1960) provides:
Any person entitled to bring an action for the recovery of real property,
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legal effect of his act. 23 However, it was decided that chronic alcoholism
did not constitute a mental derangement sufficient under the insanity
provision to toll the statute.
In 1929, Valisano v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.4 held that,

under Michigan law, insanity as set down in the statute of limitations25
meant a condition of mental derangement that actually prevented the
sufferer from comprehending rights he would otherwise have been
bound to know. This definition was affirmed in 1964 when it was held
that the new Michigan statute 26 was tolled due to the presence of a condition of unsound mind conforming to the Valisano standard.7
As early as 1918, the Supreme Court of California held in Pearl v.
Pearl2 that a party's inability to care for his property, transact business,
or understand the nature or effect of his acts, was equivalent to his
being insane and suspended the statute. 29 This definition was affirmed
in 1959 by a decision which touched upon the particular problem of
unconsciousness.30 In that decision, the district court of appeals maintained that insanity is fundamentally the equivalent of non compos
mentis, and that the incompetency of the party in question to manage
and take care of his property, coupled with only partial rationality and
sixty days of unconsciousness, constituted insanity and barred the statwho may be under any legal disability when the cause of action accrues, may
bring his action within two years after the disability is removed.
23 Roberts v. Stith, 383 P.2d 14 (Okla. 1963).
24 247 Mich. 301, 225 N.W. 607 (1929).
25 MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 12315 (1915) provided:
If any person entitled to bring any of the actions mentioned in this chapter
shall, at the time when the cause of action accrues, be ...

insane . . . such person

may bring the action within the times in this chapter respectively limited after
the disability shall be removed.
26 MIcH. COmP. LAWS

§ 609.5 (1948) provides:

If at the time when any right of entry, or of action, as aforesaid, shall first
accrue or have accrued, the person entitled to such entry or action shall be or
such person, or any one claiming from, by or
shall have been . . . insane ....
under him, may make such entry, or bring such action, at any time within 5
years after such disability shall be or shall have been removed, although the time
limited therefore in the first section of this chapter may have expired.
27 Emery v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 372 Mich. 663, 127 N.W.2d 826 (1964).
28 177 Cal. 303, 177 P. 845 (1918).
29 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1969) states:
If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in chapter three of this
title, be, at the time the cause of action accrued ...
2. Insane;...
the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
30 Gottesman v. Simon, 169 Cal. App. 2d 494, 337 P.2d 906 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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ute from running.8 ' In 1968, the Pearl definition was made even more
comprehensive when the criteria for insanity were expanded to include
incomprehension of the right to hire an attorney and institute legal
32
action.
Although insanity has been included as a disability in the New
Jersey statute since its inception,8 ' judicial comment concerning it has
been sparse. In 1834, the supreme court observed that the current New
4
Jersey statute of limitations was identical to an early English statute3
dealing with personal actions, except for a provision in the latter for
persons beyond the seas." Then, in 1897, it was held that the New
Jersey statute of limitations would not begin to run against an insane
party until he is restored to sound mind.' 6 Finally, a meaningful determination defining insanity in the statute was set down in 1965 when, in
Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc.,' 7 the supreme court considered in
depth the entire problem of insanity and the statute of limitations, and
decided that insanity, as used therein, means a condition of mental
derangement which prevents the sufferer from realizing his rights
under the law and enforcing them through legal action.
At first blush, the doctrine of the Sobin case might appear to be a
very free interpretation of the statute, or perhaps even an attempt at judicial legislation. However, a review of the decisions at hand, coupled
with a careful analysis of the statute and its purpose of preventing stale
litigation, seems to entirely justify the decision. It should be noted by
31 See also Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal. App. 2d 212, 36 Cal. Rptr. 537 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1944).
32 Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 66 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
83 See note 11 supra.
34 21 Jac. I, c. 16, § VII (1623) stated:
Provided nevertheless, and it be further enacted That if any Person or Persons
that is or shall be entitled to such Action of Trespass, Detinue, Action sur
Trover, Replevin, Actions of Accounts, Actions of debts, Actions of Trespass for
Assault, Menace, Battery, Wounding or Imprisonment, Actions upon the Case for
Words, be or shall be at the Time of any such Cause of Action given or accrued,
fallen or come, within the Age of Twenty-one Years, Femme Covert, Non compos
mentis, imprisoned or beyond the Seas; that then such Person or Persons shall
be at Liberty to bring the same Actions, so as they take the same within such
Times as are before limited, after their coming to or being of full Age, Discovert,
or sane Memory, at Large and returned from beyond the Seas, as other Persons
having no such Impediment should have done.
See also Valente v. Boggiano, 107 N.J.L. 456, 154 A. 817 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930); Thorpe
v. Corwin, 20 N.J.L. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1844).
85 Dekay v. Darrah, 14 N.J.L. 288, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1834).
86 Smith v. Felter, 61 N.J.L. 102, 38 A. 746 (Sup. Ct. 1897), aff'd, 63 N.J.L. 30, 42
A. 1053 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
37 44 N.J. 100, 207 A.2d 513 (1965).
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those who criticize the Sobin holding as judicial legislation, that the
court did not create a new definition of insanity. Instead, it merely applied the criteria for insanity as specified in Kyle. The accompanying
argument that the decision represents an extremely liberal interpretation of the insanity statute is rebutted by the court's rejection of the
defendant's contention that the plaintiff was only entitled, under the
statute, to a reasonable time in which to bring suit. The court strictly
adhered to the language of the statute in granting the plaintiff the full
statutory provision of two years.
It might also be argued that allowing an insane plaintiff an unlimited period of time in which to recover his sanity before the statute
begins to run will at times contravene the intention of eliminating stale
litigation. There might even be a suggestion that a statutory provision
be drafted to vest the insane plaintiff's remedy in another party after a
certain period of time, in order to avoid the problem.3 8 It is submitted,
however, that although the resulting period of uncertainty would be
undesirable, it is far more equitable than removing the cause of action
from a plaintiff due to his continuing insanity. A statute constructed
for the sake of expediency would be contingent upon an assumption
that, first, the injured party would have someone in a relationship designated by the statute, and, secondly, that the designated party would
actively pursue the remedy as diligently as the real party in interest.
In a factual situation similar to that in Sobin, where the defendant
himself has caused the insanity, the proposed statute would be even
more ludicrous. Not only would it be impossible to determine the extent of the damage involved until the full injury had subsided, but by
removing the cause of action from the hands of the injured party,
thereby risking possible inaction, the statute could confer benefit on
the tortfeasor.
The significance of Sobin is that unconsciousness, which contains
the elements of all the established interpretations of insanity for tolling
the statute of limitations, has been determined to constitute insanity
under the New Jersey statutory provision. Reference to the definition
of insanity as set down in Kyle clearly confirms the logic of that result:
In our view after considering the authorities we conclude that
"insane" in the statute of limitations means such a condition of
8 For example, a statute might provide that, if after two years have passed and the
insane (unconscious) party has not recovered, a member of his family or a close friend
may be appointed by the court as a guardian ad litem and be required to bring the
action for the injured party within the period allowed by statute after his appointment.
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mental derangement as actually prevents the sufferer from understanding his legal rights or instituting legal action.89
Can an unconscious plaintiff truly be expected to fully understand his
legal rights and institute legal action?
Thomas W. Cavanagh, Jr.
89 44 N.J. at 113. 207 A.2d at 521.

